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Abstract. Adversarial attacks have been widely studied for general clas-
sification tasks, but remain unexplored in the context of fine-grained
recognition, where the inter-class similarities facilitate the attacker’s task.
In this paper, we identify the proximity of the latent representations of
different classes in fine-grained recognition networks as a key factor to the
success of adversarial attacks. We therefore introduce an attention-based
regularization mechanism that maximally separates the discriminative
latent features of different classes while minimizing the contribution of
the non-discriminative regions to the final class prediction. As evidenced
by our experiments, this allows us to significantly improve robustness to
adversarial attacks, to the point of matching or even surpassing that of
adversarial training, but without requiring access to adversarial samples.
Keywords: Fine-grained Recognition, Adversarial Defense, Network In-
terpretability
1 Introduction
Deep networks yield impressive results in many computer vision tasks [21,19,15,49].
Nevertheless, their performance degrades under adversarial attacks, where natu-
ral examples are perturbed with human-imperceptible, carefully crafted noise [10].
Adversarial attacks have been extensively studied for the task of general object
recognition [29,10,20,28,3,6], with much effort dedicated to studying and im-
proving the robustness of deep networks to such attacks [22,14,45]. However,
adversarial attacks and defense mechanisms for fine-grained recognition prob-
lems, where one can expect the inter-class similarities to facilitate the attacker’s
task, remain unexplored.
In this paper, we therefore analyze the reasons for the success of adversarial
attacks on fine-grained recognition techniques and introduce a defense mecha-
nism to improve a network’s robustness. To this end, we visualize the image
regions mostly responsible for the classification results. Specifically, we consider
both the attention-based framework of [8], closely related to class activation
maps (CAMs) [51], and the recent prototypical part network (ProtoPNet) of [5],
designed for fine-grained recognition, which relates local image regions to inter-
pretable prototypes. As shown in Fig. 1, an adversarial example activates either
confusing regions that look similar in samples from the true class and from the
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Fig. 1: Interpreting adversarial attacks for fine-grained recognition. We
analyze the attention maps, obtained with [8](a) and [5](b), of four images from the
Black-footed albatross class. Under attack, these images are misclassified as closely-
related bird species, such as Layman albatross, because the classifiers focus on either
confusing regions that look similar in these classes, such as the bird’s beak, or non-
discriminative background regions, such as water.
class activated by the adversarial attack, such as the beak of the bird, or, in
the ProtoPNet case, non-discriminative background regions, such as water. thus
making the network more vulnerable to attacks.
Motivated this observation, we introduce a defense mechanism based on the
intuition that the discriminative regions of each class should be maximally sep-
arated from that of the other classes. To this end, we design an attention-aware
model that pushes away the discriminative prototypes of the different classes.
The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated in Fig. 2, where the prototypes
of different classes are nicely separated, except for those corresponding to non-
discriminative regions. However, by means of an attention mechanism, we enforce
these non-discriminative prototypes to play no role in the final class prediction.
Ultimately, our approach reduces the influence of the non-discriminative regions
on the classification while increasing the magnitude of the displacement in the
latent space that the attacker must perform to successfully move the network’s
prediction away from the true label. As evidenced by our experiments, our ap-
proach significantly outperforms in robustness the baseline ProtoPNet and at-
tentional pooling network, in some cases reaching adversarial accuracies on par
with or higher than their adversarially-trained [40,39] counterparts, but at vir-
tually no additional computational cost.
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Fig. 2: t-SNE visualization of the prototypes from 12 fine-grained
classes of the CUB200 dataset. In ProtoPNet [5], the prototypes of dif-
ferent classes are not well separated, making the network vulnerable to attacks.
By contrast, our approach yields well-separated discriminative prototypes, while
clustering the background ones, which, by means of an attention mechanism do
not participate the prediction. This complicates the attacker’s task.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows. We analyze and ex-
plain the decisions of fine-grained recognition networks by studying the image
regions responsible for classification for both clean and adversarial examples. We
design an interpretable, attention-aware network for robust fine-grained recogni-
tion by constraining the latent space of discriminative regions. Our method im-
proves robustness to a level comparable to that of adversarial training, without
requiring access to adversarial samples and without trading off clean accuracy.
We will make our code publicly available upon acceptance of the paper.
2 Related Work
Adversarial Robustness. DNNs were first shown to be vulnerable to adver-
sarial, human-imperceptible perturbations in the context of general image recog-
nition. Such attacks were initially studied in [38], quickly followed by the simple
single-step Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10] and its multiple-step BIM
variant [20]. In [6], the attacks were stabilized by incorporating momentum in
the gradient computation. Other popular attacks include DeepFool [28], which
iteratively linearizes the classifier to compute minimal perturbations sufficient
for the sample to cross the decision boundary, and other computationally more
expensive attacks, such as CW [3], JSMA [29], and others [46,37,26]. As of to-
day, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [22], which utilizes the local first-order
network information to compute a maximum loss increment within a specified
`∞ norm-bound, is generally considered as the most effective attack strategy.
Despite a significant research effort in devising defense mechanisms against
adversarial attacks [30,32,44,36], it was shown in [2] that most such defenses can
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easily be breached in the white-box setting, where the attacker knows the net-
work architecture. The main exception to this rule is adversarial training [22],
where the model is trained jointly with clean images and their adversarial coun-
terparts. Many variants of adversarial training were thus proposed, such as en-
semble adversarial training [39] to soften the classifier’s decision boundaries,
ALP [14] to minimize the difference between the logit activations of real and
adversarial images, the use of additional feature denoising blocks [45], of met-
ric learning [23], and of regularizers to penalize changes in the model’s predic-
tion w.r.t. the input perturbations [31,50]. Nevertheless, PGD-based adversarial
training remains the method of choice, thanks to its robustness and generaliz-
ability to unseen attacks [10,20,28,3].
Unfortunately, adversarial training is computationally expensive. This was
tackled in [34] by recycling the gradients computed to update the model pa-
rameters so as to reduce the overhead of generating adversarial examples, albeit
not remove this overhead entirely. More recently, [43] showed that combining the
single-step FGSM with random initialization is almost as effective as PGD-based
training, but at a significantly lower cost. Unlike all of the adversarial training
strategies, our approach does not require computing adversarial images, and
does thus not depend on a specific attack scheme. Instead, it aims to ensure a
maximal separation between the different classes in high attention regions. This
significantly differs from [24], which only clusters the penultimate layer’s global
representation, without focusing on discriminative regions and without attempt-
ing to separate these features. Furthermore and more importantly, in contrast to
all the above-mentioned methods, our approach is tailored to fine-grained recog-
nition, making use of the representations that have proven effective in this field,
such as Bags of Words (BoW) [13,42] and VLAD [1,9], which have the advantage
over second-order features [47,17,7] of providing some degree of interpretability.
Interpretability. Understanding the decisions of a DNN is highly important
in real-world applications to build user trust. In the context of general image
recognition, the trend of interpreting a DNN’s decision was initiated by [48],
followed by the popular CAMs [51]. Subsequently, variants of CAMs [33,4] and
other visualization strategies [27] were proposed.
Here, in contrast to these works, we focus on the task of fine-grained recog-
nition. In this domain, BoW-inspired representations, such as the one of [25]
and the ProtoPNet of [5], were shown to provide some degree of interpretabil-
ity. However, the VLAD prototypes extracted by the method of [25] are not
enforced to be class-specific. As such, while this method allows one to highlight
the image regions important for classification, it does not provide one with visual
explanations of the network’s decisions.
This is addressed by ProtoPNet [5], which extracts class-specific prototypes.
However, the feature embedding learnt by ProtoPNet gives equal importance
to all image regions, resulting in a large number of prototypes representing
non-discriminative background regions, as illustrated by Fig. 1. Here, we over-
come this by designing an attention-aware system that learns prototypes which
are close to high-attention regions in feature space, while constraining the non-
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discriminative regions from all classes to be close to each other. Furthermore,
we show that this brings about not only interpretability, but also robustness to
adversarial attacks, which has never been studied in the context of fine-grained
recognition.
3 Interpreting Adversarial Attacks
Before delving into our method, let us study in more detail the experiment
depicted by Fig. 1 to understand the decision of a fine-grained recognition CNN
under adversarial attack. For this analysis, we experiment with two networks: the
second-order attentional pooling network of [8] and the ProtoPNet of [5], both
of which inherently encode some notion of interpretability in their architecture,
thus not requiring any post-processing. Specifically, [8] uses class attention maps
to compute class probabilities, whereas [5] exploits the similarity between image
regions and class-specific prototypes. We analyze the reasons for the success of
adversarial attacks on four images from the Black-footed albatross class.
As shown in Fig 1(a), under attack, [8] misclassifies all four images to Layman
albatross. Note that these two classes belong to the same general Albatross fam-
ily, and, for clean samples, the region with highest attention for these two classes
is the bird’s beak. Because the discriminative regions for these two classes cor-
respond to the same beak region, which looks similar in both classes, the attack
becomes easier as minimal perturbation is needed to change the class label.
In the case of ProtoPNet [5], while the network also consistently misclassifies
the attacked images, the resulting label differs across the different images, as
shown in Fig. 1 (b). In the top row, the situation is similar to that occurring
with the method of [8]. By contrast, in the second row, the region activated in the
input image corresponds to a different semantic part (wing) than that activated
in the prototype (beak). Finally, in the last two rows, the network activates a
background prototype that is common across the other categories and thus more
vulnerable to attacks.
In essence, the mistakes observed in Fig 1 come from either the discrimi-
native regions of two different classes being two close in feature space, or the
use of non-discriminative regions for classification. This motivates us to encour-
age the feature representation of discriminative regions from different classes
to be maximally separated from each other, while minimizing the influence of
background regions by making use of attention and by encouraging the features
in these regions to lie close to each other so as not to be discriminative. This
will complicate the attacker’s task, by preventing their ability to leverage non-
discriminative regions and forcing them to make larger changes in feature space
to affect the prediction.
4 Method
In this section, we introduce our approach to increasing the robustness of fine-
grained recognition by maximal separation of class-specific discriminative re-
gions. Figure 3 gives an overview our framework, which consists of two modules
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Fig. 3: Overview of our framework. Our approach consists of two modules
acting on the features extracted by a backbone network. The attention module
extracts attention maps that help the network to focus on the discriminative
image regions. The feature regularization module further uses the attention maps
to encourage separating the learned prototypes belonging to different classes.
post feature extraction: (i) An attention module that learns class-specific filters
focusing on the discriminative regions; and (ii) a feature regularization module
that maximally separates the class-specific features deemed discriminative by
the attention module. Through the feature regularization module, we achieve
the dual objective of providing interpretability and increasing the robustness of
the backbone network to adversarial attacks.
Note that, at inference time, we can either use the entire framework for pre-
diction, or treat the attention module, together with the backbone feature ex-
tractor, as an standalone network. As will be demonstrated by our experiments,
both strategies yield robustness to adversarial attacks, which evidences that our
approach in fact robustifies the final feature map. Below, we first describe the
overall architecture of our framework and then discuss the feature regularization
module in more detail.
4.1 Architecture
Formally, let Ii denote an input image, and Xi ∈ RH×W×D′ represent the corre-
sponding feature map extracted by a fully-convolutional backbone network. Our
architecture is inspired by the ProtoPNet of [5], in the sense that we also rely
on class-specific prototypes. However, as shown in Section 3, ProtoPNet fails
to learn discriminative prototypes, because it allows the prototypes to encode
non-discriminative background information and to be close in feature space even
if they belong to different classes. To address this, we propose to focus on the
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important regions via an attention mechanism and to regularize the prototypes
during training.
Specifically, our attention module consists of two sets of filters: (i) A class-
agnostic 1×1×D′ filter yielding a single-channel map of size H×W ; and (ii) K
class-specific 1× 1×D′ filters producing K maps of size H ×W corresponding
to the K classes in the dataset. Each of the class-specific map is then multiplied
by the class-agnostic one, and the result is spatially averaged to generate a K-
dimensional output. As shown in [8], this multiplication of two attention maps is
equivalent to a rank-1 approximation of second-order pooling, which has proven
to be well-suited to aggregate local features for fine-grained recognition.
The second branch of our network extracts interpretable prototypes and is
responsible to increase the robustness of the features extracted by the back-
bone. To this end, Xi is first processed by two 1× 1 convolutional layers to de-
crease the channel dimension to D. The resulting representation is then passed
through a prototype layer that contains m learnable prototypes of size 1 ×
1 × D, resulting in m similarity maps of size H × W . Specifically, the pro-
totype layer computes the L2 distance between each local feature and each
prototype, and passes this distance through an activation function defined as
f(r) = log
(
(‖r‖22 + 1)/(‖r‖22 + γ)
)
, where γ is set to 1e−5. In contrast to [5], to
focus on discriminative regions, we modulate the resulting similarity maps with
an attention map Ai, computed by max-pooling the final class-specific maps of
the attention module. We then spatially max-pool the resulting attention-aware
similarity maps to obtain similarity scores, which are passed through the final
classification layer to yield class probabilities. As in [5], we make the prototypes
class specific by splitting the m prototypes into K sets of c prototypes and ini-
tializing the weights of the classification layer of the prototype branch to +1
for positive connections between prototype and class label and -0.5 for negative
ones. While exploiting attention encourages the prototypes to focus on the dis-
criminative regions, nothing explicitly prevents prototypes from different classes
to remain close in feature space, thus yielding a small margin between different
classes and making the classifier vulnerable to attacks. This is what we address
below.
4.2 Discriminative Feature Separation
To learn a robust feature representation, we introduce two feature regularization
losses that aim to maximally separate the prototypes of different classes. Let xti
represent a local feature vector at location t in feature map Xi from image Ii
with label yi. Furthermore, let N =W ·H be the total number of feature vectors
in Xi, and Pyi be the set of prototypes belonging to class yi.
Our regularization consists of two attention-aware losses, a clustering one and
a separation one. The attentional-clustering loss pulls the high-attention regions
in a sample close to the nearest prototype of its own class. We express this as
Lattclst(Ii) =
N∑
t=1
ati min
l:pl∈Pyi
‖xti − pl‖22 , (1)
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where ati is the attention value at location t in Ai. By contrast, the attentional-
separation loss pushes the high-attention regions away from the nearest proto-
type of any other class. We compute it as
Lattsep(Ii) = −
N∑
t=1
ati min
l:pl 6∈Pyi
‖xti − pl‖22 . (2)
While these two loss functions encourage the prototypes to focus on high-
attention, discriminative regions, they leave the low-attention regions free to
be close to any prototype, thus increasing the vulnerability of the network to
attacks. We therefore further need to push the non-discriminative regions away
from such informative prototypes. A seemingly natural way to achieve this would
consist of exploiting inverted attention maps, such as 1 − at or 1/at. However,
in practice, we observed this to make training unstable. Instead, we therefore
propose to make use of the attention maps from other samples to compute the
loss for sample i. Specifically, we re-write our regularization loss for sample i as
Lreg(Ii) =
B∑
j=1
N∑
t=1
λ1a
t
j min
l:pl∈Pyi
‖xti − pl‖22 − λ2atj min
l:pl 6∈Pyi
‖xti − pl‖22 , (3)
where B is the number of samples in the mini-batch. When j = i, we recover
the two loss terms defined in Eqs. 1 and 2. By contrast, when j 6= i, we exploit
the attention map of a different sample. The intuition behind this is that either
the attention map of sample j focuses on the same regions as that of sample i,
and thus the loss serves the same purpose as when using the attention of sample
i, or it focuses on other regions, and the loss then pushes the corresponding
feature map, encoding a low-attention region according to the attention map
of sample i, to its own prototype in class yi. In practice, we have observed
this procedure to typically yield a single background prototype per class. These
background prototypes inherently become irrelevant for classification because
they correspond to low-attention regions and have thus a similarity score close
to zero, thanks to our attention-modulated similarity maps. As such, we have
empirically found that all background prototypes tend to cluster.
Ultimately, we write our total loss function for sample i as
L(Ii) = CEatt(Ii) + CEreg(Ii) + Lreg(Ii) ,
where CEatt and CEreg represent the cross-entropy loss of the attention module
and the feature regularization module, respectively.
At inference time, we perform adversarial attacks on the joint system by ex-
ploiting the cross-entropy loss of both the attention and feature regularization
module. Furthermore, we also attack the attention module on its own, show-
ing that, together with the feature extraction backbone, it can be used as a
standalone network and also inherits robustness from our training strategy.
5 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our approach on several fine-grained recognition
benchmark datasets. Below, we first discuss the details of our experimental set-
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ting, and then evidence the benefits of our approach over several baselines both
quantitatively and qualitatively.
5.1 Experimental Setting
Datasets. We experiment on two popular fine-grained datasets, Caltech UCSD
Birds (CUB) [41] and Stanford Cars-196 [18]. CUB consists of 11,788 images
from 200 fine-grained categories of birds with large variations in pose, split into
5394 training and 5794 testing images. Stanford Cars-196 contains 16,185 images
from 196 classes, with 8144 training and 8041 testing images. For all our experi-
ments, we use the standard train-test splits released with the datasets. Similarly
to [5], we perform data augmentation offline on every image in the dataset, us-
ing random rotation, distortion, and skew and flip operations to obtain a 30 fold
increase in dataset size. For evaluation, we report the accuracy over the entire
dataset as in [5,8].
Threat Model. We consider both white-box and black-box attacks under an `∞-
norm budget. We evaluate robustness for two attack tolerances  = {2/255, 8/255}.
In addition to the popular 10-step PGD attack [22], we test our framework with
FGSM [10], BIM [20], and MI [6] attacks. For PGD attacks, we set the step size
α to 1/255 for  = 2/255 and to 2/255 for  = 8/255. For the other attacks, we
set number of iterations to 10 and the step size α to  divided by the number
of iterations, as in [24,23]. For black-box attacks, we transfer the adversarial
examples generated using 10-step PGD with  = 8/255 and α = 2/255 on either
a similar VGG16 [35] architecture, or a completely different DenseNet-121 [12]
architecture. We denote by BB-V and BB-D the black-box attacks transferred
from VGG16 and DenseNet-121, respectively.
Networks. We evaluate our approach using 3 backbone networks: VGG-16 [35],
VGG-19 [35] and ResNet-34 [11]. Similarly to [5], we perform all experiments on
images cropped according to the bounding boxes provided with the dataset, and
resize the resulting images to 224× 224. For both VGG-16 and VGG-19, we use
the convolutional layers until the 4th block to output 7× 7 spatial maps of 512
channels. For ResNet-34, we take the network excluding the final global average
pooling layer as backbone. We initialize the backbone networks with weights
pretrained on ImageNet [19].
Evaluated Methods. As baselines, we use the attentional pooling network (AP)
of [8], and the state-of-the-art ProtoPNet of [5]. We use Ours-FR and Ours-
A to denote the output of our feature regularization module and of our attention
module, respectively. In other words, AP and Ours-A share the same architecture
at inference time, and Ours-FR is an attention-aware variant of ProtoPNet.
To further boost the performance of the baselines and of our approach, we
perform adversarial training. Specifically, we generate adversarial examples using
the recent fast adversarial training strategy of [43], which relies on a single step
FGSM with random initialization. During training, we set  to 8/255 and α to
1.25 as suggested in [43]. This was shown in [43] to perform on par with PGD-
based adversarial training, while being computationally much less expensive.
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For our approach, during fast adversarial training, we use the cross-entropy loss
of both modules to generate the adversarial images. We denote by AP-AT
and ProtoPNet-AT the adversarially-trained AP and ProtoPNet baselines,
respectively, and by Ours-FR+AT andOurs-A+AT the adversarially-trained
counterparts of our two sub-networks.
Training Details. We implemented our approach using the PyTorch library, and
ran our experiments on a single 32GB Tesla GPU. We set the mini-batch size B
to 75 during training. We use c = 10 prototypes per class, resulting in a total
of m = 2000 and m = 1960 prototypes for CUB [41] and Cars [18], respectively.
We set λ1 to {10, 100} and λ2 = 0.08 depending on the dataset and architecture.
We first fine-tune the attention and feature regularization modules, except for
the classification layer of the latter, for 5 epochs with a learning rate of 0.0003,
keeping the backbone network fixed. We then jointly train all the layers, except
the feature regularization classifier, to minimize the objective of Eq. 3 for 25
epochs, with an initial learning rate of 0.003 and a decay rate of 0.1 applied
every 10 epochs. After 30 epochs, we project the prototypes to the nearest train-
ing image patch of the same class and optimize the classification layer of the
feature regularization module for 15 epochs. We use Adam [16] with the default
momentum values for all our experiments.
5.2 Results on CUB 200
Quantitative Analysis. We first compare the accuracy of our method to that of
the baselines with the three backbone networks on CUB200. Table 1 and Table 2
provide the results for vanilla and fast adversarial training, respectively. On the
clean samples, Our-A yields the best accuracy across all backbones, and Ours-
FR typically surpasses its non-attentional counterpart ProtoPNet [5]. This is
true both without (Table 1) and with (Table 2) adversarial training.
Under adversarial attack, our approach, without and with adversarial train-
ing, yields better robustness under almost all attacks and backbones. Impor-
tantly, the boost in performance is larger for attacks with larger perturbations.
Furthermore, our model trained with clean samples sometimes outperform even
the adversarially-trained baselines. For example, on VGG-16 with PGD attack
with  = 8/255, AP+AT yields an accuracy of 16.9% (Table 2) while Ours-A
reaches 21.8% accuracy (Table 1). This evidences the ability of our feature reg-
ularization module to learn robust features, even without seeing any adversarial
examples. This is further supported by the fact that, despite AP and Ours-A
having the same architecture at inference, Ours-A is more robust to attacks.
Furthermore, in contrast to adversarially-trained models, our vanilla approach
does not trade off clean accuracy for robustness. For example, on VGG-16, while
adversarial training made the clean accuracy of AP+AT drop to 54.9% (Ta-
ble 2), that of Ours-A is 80.4% (Table 1). In other words, we achieve good
robustness and clean accuracy.
Transferability Analysis. To evaluate robustness to black-box attacks, we transfer
adversarial examples generated from substitute networks to our framework and
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Attacks Clean FGSM FGSM BIM BIM PGD PGD MIM MIM BB-V BB-D
(Steps,) (0,0) (1,2) (1,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8)
VGG16
AP [8] 78.0% 36.5% 31.0% 27.7% 14.6% 23.5% 11.7% 30.2% 16.7% 9.6% 60.4%
ProtoPNet [5] 69.0% 19.9% 8.10% 3.80% 0.00% 2.20% 0.00% 5.0% 0.10% 22.9% 58.5%
Ours-A 80.4% 47.2% 40.2% 40.0% 23.2% 35.3% 21.8% 42.2% 26.4% 12.9% 66.9%
Ours-FR 73.2% 49.9% 42.2% 42.5% 35.3% 38.4% 30.1% 42.9% 37.5% 15.4% 59.7%
VGG19
AP [8] 75.7% 20.4% 14.5% 13.4% 6.9% 10.5% 5.7% 14.8% 6.9% 21.1% 61.3%
ProtoPNet [5] 73.8% 22.9% 11.1% 3.2% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 21.0% 58.0%
Ours-A 79.7% 51.4% 44.6% 42.3% 26.5% 36.8% 26.3% 45.0% 42.6% 29.8% 68.2%
Ours-FR 75.4% 52.2% 46.3% 46.6% 41.3% 42.4% 31.0% 44.4% 37.6% 30.4% 63.7%
ResNet-34
AP [8] 79.9% 30.4% 26.3% 18.0% 7.20% 13.2% 5.8% 22.3% 8.6% 43.0% 59.4%
ProtoPNet [5] 75.1% 23.2% 12.8% 7.80% 1.80% 4.10% 1.00% 8.90% 2.20% 39.1% 53.0%
Ours-A 80.3% 31.6% 20.1% 17.4% 9.90% 13.5% 9.20% 19.9% 11.4% 47.9% 64.6%
Ours-FR 75.2% 31.2% 23.9% 22.2% 20.2% 21.4% 18.2% 23.4% 20.8% 43.7% 58.9%
Table 1: Classification accuracy of different networks with `∞ based attacks on
CUB200. The best result of each column and each backbone is shown in bold. The
last two columns correspond to black-box attacks.
to the baselines. As substitute models, we use a VGG-16 [35] and DenseNet-
121 [12] backbone followed by global average pooling and a classification layer.
The corresponding results are reported in the last two columns of Table 1 and
Table 2. As in the white-box case, our approach outperforms the baselines in this
black-box setting, thus confirming its effectiveness at learning robust features.
Qualitative Analysis. Let us now qualitatively evidence the benefits of our ap-
proach. To this end, in Figure 7, we visualize the 10 class-specific prototypes
learned by ProtPNet and by our approach for the Blackfooted albatross class.
Specifically, we show the activation heatmaps of these prototypes on the source
image that they have been projected to. Note that ProtoPNet learns multiple
background prototypes, whereas our approach encodes all the background in-
formation in a single non-discriminative prototype. Furthermore, ProtoPNet [5]
focuses on much larger regions, which can be expected to be less discriminative
than the fine-grained regions obtained using our approach. This is due to our use
of attention, which helps the prototypes to focus on the areas that are important
for classification.
In Figure 5, we analyze the effect of adversarial attacks on AP, ProtoPNet
and our approach (all without adversarial training) by visualizing the attention
maps and/or a few top activated prototypes along with their similarity scores
for a Blackfooted albatross image with and without attack. Without attack, AP
activates a larger region than our attention module. Furthermore, ProtoPNet
activates a prototype from a different class (Cape glossay starling), while our
approach focuses on the correct class only. This already shows that the features
learned by these baselines are less discriminative, making them more vulnerable
to adversarial attacks. As a matter of fact, under attack, AP focuses on a differ-
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Attacks Clean FGSM FGSM BIM BIM PGD PGD MIM MIM BB-V BB-D
(Steps,) (0,0) (1,2) (1,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8)
VGG16
AP+AT [8] 54.9% 44.9% 24.2% 41.9% 18.2% 41.2% 16.9% 41.9% 18.7% 54.6% 54.0%
ProtoPNet+AT [5]60.1% 44.5% 26.9% 57.1% 10.9% 35.9% 10.3% 37.6% 13.5% 58.4% 59.1%
Ours-AP+AT 63.1%56.1%34.8% 51.7% 29.6% 50.8%28.0% 52.0%32.5%66.3% 68.0%
Ours-P+AT 63.0% 53.3% 37.3%49.4% 30.4%48.1% 28.6%49.7% 31.1% 61.1% 62.0%
VGG19
AP+AT [8] 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0% 0%
ProtoPNet+AT [5]55.1% 40.0% 28.9% 26.5% 11.3% 29.7% 9.60% 25.6% 10.2% 53.6% 53.9%
Ours-A+AT 68.2%57.1%36.5% 53.2% 30.4% 52.6%29.2%53.5%31.2% 66.2% 66.9%
Ours-FR+AT 64.4% 55.5% 37.4%51.2% 30.6%50.4% 28.7% 52.1% 32.3%62.5% 63.2%
ResNet-34
AP+AT [8] 55.6% 47.8% 29.2% 44.80%21.0% 44.5% 19.4% 44.9% 21.9% 55.30%55.2%
ProtoPNet+AT [5]57.9% 46.5% 30.3% 41.1% 21.1% 40.3% 18.4% 41.5% 20.9% 56.9% 57.0%
Ours-A+AT 62.2%54.2%35.7%51.5% 25.5%51.0%23.1%51.6%26.6%61.5% 61.9%
Ours-FR+AT 57.6% 49.5% 32.3% 45.8% 23.2% 44.9% 19.9% 46.1% 24.6% 57.1% 57.0%
Table 2: Classification accuracy of different robust networks with `∞ based attacks on
CUB200. The best result of each column and each backbone is shown in bold. The last
two columns correspond to black-box attacks. Note that AP+AT on VGG19 did not
converge.
ent region that is not discriminative for the Blackfooted albatross class. Similarly,
ProtoPNet activates prototypes of different classes with high similarity scores,
highlighting non-discriminative regions. By contrast, the prototypes activated
by our approach remain the same as in the clean case, thus corresponding to
the correct class. Nevertheless, the similarity scores drop significantly. This sug-
gests a potential strategy to detect an attack by analyzing the magnitude of the
similarity scores, which we leave for future work.
Fig. 4: Comparison of the prototypes learned with ProtoPNet [5] and
with our approach on CUB. ProtoPNet yields multiple background proto-
types and prototypes that focus on large regions. By contrast, our prototypes
are finer-grained and thus more representative of the specific class in the images.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of the activated image regions without and with
attack. Without attack, the baselines (AP and ProtoPNet) tend to rely on
relatively large regions, sometimes corresponding to wrong classes, for prediction.
By contrast, our approach focuses more closely on the discriminative regions.
Under attack, this phenomenon is further increased, with ProtoPNet and AP
activating incorrect prototypes and regions. The activations obtained with our
approach remain similar to those obtained without attacks, albeit with a decrease
in the similarity scores, indicated above the top prototype activation maps.
5.3 Results on Stanford Cars
We now present on results on Stanford Cars [18]. In Table 3, we report the results
obtained using vanilla training. As in the CUB case, our approach yields better
robustness than the baselines. We provide a qualitative analysis and the results
obtained with adversarial training in the supplementary material.
In Figure 6, we compare the prototypes learned with ProtoPNet and with
our approach for the Accura TL Sedan class. As before, while the prototypes
learned by ProtoPNet cover large regions, those obtained with our framework
are more focused on the discriminative parts of the car.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have performed the first study of adversarial attacks for fine-
grained recognition. Our analysis has highlighted the key factor for the success
of adversarial attacks in this context. This has inspired us to design an attention-
and prototype-based framework that explicitly encourages the prototypes to fo-
cus on the discriminative image regions. Our experiments have evidenced the
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the prototypes learned with ProtoPNet [5] and
with our approach on Stanford-Cars. ProtoPNet yields prototypes that
cover large regions, whereas our prototypes more focused.
Attacks Clean FGSM FGSM BIM BIM PGD PGD MIM MIM BB-V BB-D
(Steps,) (0,0) (1,2) (1,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8)
VGG16
AP [8] 91.2% 52.6% 40.2% 37.4% 10.5% 28.8% 6.93% 41.7% 12.9% 12.5% 82.5%
ProtoPNet [5] 84.5% 31.2% 9.85% 4.78% 0.01% 2.23% 0.00% 6.5% 0.01% 27.8% 75.5%
Ours-A 88.5% 58.7% 40.2% 48.0% 28.6% 46.5% 21.7% 53.2% 33.2% 19.9% 82.2%
Ours-FR 83.8% 60.1% 52.0% 51.3% 41.0% 47.8% 32.9% 51.8% 43.9% 23.4% 75.1%
VGG19
AP 91.5% 50.1% 37.8% 33.4% 10.3% 23.83% 6.93% 37.9% 12.7% 20.7% 82.8%
ProtoPNet [5] 85.6% 34.1% 20.8% 11.3% 1.11% 4.40% 0.5% 14.2% 1.39% 26.5% 75.5%
Ours-A 88.7% 64.4% 54.8% 56.4% 36.7% 51.7% 33.4% 58.1% 41.0% 35.9% 82.5%
Ours-FR 85.0% 62.4% 54.7% 54.5% 45.7% 51.2% 38.5% 54.3% 47.6% 36.1% 76.8%
ResNet-34
AP 90.5% 38.8% 31.7% 23.2% 8.12% 16.3% 6.6% 28.5% 10.1% 50.8% 76.6%
ProtoPNet [5] 88.3% 33.1% 15.3% 8.9% 3.6% 6.1% 3.4% 9.6% 3.6% 45.0% 70.6%
Ours-A 89.6% 37.0% 29.2% 25.4% 16.2% 20.6% 14.8% 27.8% 17.9% 52.7% 79.1%
Ours-FR 87.2% 40.6% 32.0% 29.1% 24.2% 26.5% 18.8% 29.8% 24.9% 48.4% 74.3%
Table 3: Classification accuracy of different undefended networks with `∞ based at-
tacks on Cars196. The best result of each column and each backbone is shown in bold.
The last two columns correspond to black-box attacks.
benefits of our approach, able to match and sometimes even outperform adver-
sarial training, despite not requiring seeing adversarial examples during training.
An interesting observation arising from our experiments is that, even when our
method is robust to an attack, the similarity scores it computes tend to be lower.
In the future, we will therefore investigate if this can be leveraged to design an
attack detection mechanism.
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7 Qualitative Results on CUB
In this section, we provide additional qualitative results on CUB200. In partic-
ular, we visualize the learned prototypes, and analyze the classification results
by computing the similarity of the samples with the learned prototypes.
Visualization of the learned prototypes. In Figure 7, we show the activation
heat maps of the prototypes on the source images to which they were projected
for our VGG-16 model. Our method yields fine-grained prototypes that either fo-
cus on a small discriminative region or activate the complete non-discriminative
region.
Nearest samples of the learned prototypes. In Figure 8, we show the pro-
totypes and their nearest training images for CUB 200 with VGG-16. Similarly,
in Figure 9, we show the prototypes and their nearest test images for CUB 200
with VGG-16. In most cases, the discriminative prototypes activate the same
semantic part in all images corresponding to the same class.
Nearest prototypes for a clean image. In Figure 10, we show, for a given
clean test image, the top few highest activated prototypes with VGG-16. We
observe that the most activated prototypes focus on salient and discriminative
regions, with no influence from the background regions.
Nearest prototypes for an adversarial image. In Figure 11, we show the
top few highest activated codewords for unsuccessful adversarial samples that
retain the predicted label even after the attack. Note that, under attack, the
similarity scores of the top activated prototypes decrease, but, thanks to the
large separation between the prototypes, the discriminative features do not cross
over to other prototypes.
8 Results on Stanford Cars
In Table 4, we report the robustness of fast adversarial training [43] with our
discriminative feature separation approach. Our approach, Ours-FR+AT, per-
forms better than the baseline ProtoPNet+AT [5] in all cases. Note that, for
multi-step iterative attacks, Ours-A+AT performs better than AP+AT, while
they achieve comparable performance for single-step attacks.
Visualization of the learned prototypes. In Figure 12, we show the acti-
vation heat maps of the prototypes on the source images to which they were
projected for our VGG-16 model. Our method yields fine-grained prototypes
that either focus on a small discriminative region or activate the complete non-
discriminative region.
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Attacks Clean FGSM FGSM BIM BIM PGD PGD MIM MIM BB-V BB-D
Steps,) (1,2) (1,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8) (10,2) (10,8)
VGG16
AP+AT [8] 86.2% 81.1% 63.6% 78.9% 53.8% 78.7% 50.8% 78.7% 55.1% 85.1% 85.9%
ProtoPNet+AT [5] 64.4% 53.7% 31.9% 48.9% 16.5% 48.2% 13.4% 49.2% 18.2% 63.8% 64.2%
Ours-A+AT 84.8% 79.8% 63.3% 77.0% 54.6% 76.6% 51.1% 77.1% 55.8% 84.5% 85.6%
Ours-FR+AT 83.7% 76.37% 62.8% 73.5% 55.0% 72.6% 51.9% 73.8% 55.4% 80.8% 82.0%
VGG19
AP+AT [8] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
ProtoPNet+AT [5] 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Ours-A+AT 87.3% 80.29% 67.1% 78.4% 60.15% 78.2% 58.2% 78.6% 61.3% 86.5% 87.3%
Ours-FR+AT 84.6% 79.6% 66.9% 77.7% 58.6% 76.5% 55.6% 77.8% 59.1% 83.7% 84.5%
ResNet-34
AP+AT [8] 84.3% 80.3% 67.0% 78.7% 55.3% 78.6% 51.9% 78.7% 56.8% 84.1% 84.3%
ProtoPNet+AT [5] 78.1% 70.4% 53.5% 66.3% 37.9% 65.7% 33.0% 66.8% 39.1% 77.6% 78.6%
Ours-A+AT 85.1% 80.8% 65.9% 79.0% 54.5% 78.8% 49.9% 79.1% 56.5% 84.7% 85.1%
Ours-FR+AT 82.6% 77.9% 63.8% 75.91% 49.97% 76.28 48.1% 76.1% 52.4% 83.0% 83.2%
Table 4: Classification accuracy of different robust networks with `∞ based attacks on
Cars196. The best result of each column and each backbone is shown in bold. The last
two columns correspond to black-box attacks. Note that, AP+AT, ProtPNet+AT did
not converge for VGG-19.
Nearest samples of the learned prototypes. In Figure 13, we show the pro-
totypes and their nearest training images for Cars 196 with VGG-16. Similarly,
in Figure 14, we show the prototypes and their nearest test images for Cars 196
with VGG-16. In most cases, the discriminative prototypes activate the same
semantic part in all images corresponding to the same class.
Nearest prototypes for an adversarial image. In Figure 15, we show the
top few highest activated codewords for unsuccessful adversarial samples that
retain the predicted label even after the attack. Note that, under attack, the
similarity scores of the top activated prototypes decrease, but, thanks to the
large separation between the prototypes, the discriminative features do not cross
over to other prototypes.
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Fig. 7: Visualization of the prototypes learned with our approach on
CUB. Our formulation yields prototypes that are fine-grained and representa-
tive of the specific class in the images.
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Fig. 8: Visualization of the nearest train samples for each learned pro-
totypes with our approach on CUB with VGG-16. All prototypes activate
semantically meaningful parts and mostly from the images corresponding to their
own label.
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Fig. 9: Visualization of the nearest test samples for each learned proto-
types with our approach on CUB with VGG-16. All prototypes activate
semantically meaningful parts and mostly from the images corresponding to their
own label.
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 23
Fig. 10: Visualization of the top activated prototypes for a given test
image on CUB. The top prototypes activate semantically meaningful regions
and discard the background areas.
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Fig. 11: Visualization of the top activated prototypes for a given clean
and adversarial image pair from the CUB test data. The top prototypes
corresponds to the true label, even after attack. Moreover, we observe that the
similarity score for each prototype decreases, but the attack remains unsuccessful
thanks to the large separation between the discriminative prototypes.
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Fig. 12: Visualization of the prototypes learned with our approach on
Cars-196. Our formulation yields prototypes that are fine-grained and repre-
sentative of the specific class in the images.
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Fig. 13: Visualization of the nearest train samples for each learned pro-
totypes with our approach on Cars-196 with VGG-16. All prototypes ac-
tivate semantically meaningful parts and mostly from the images corresponding
to their own label.
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Fig. 14: Visualization of the nearest test samples for each learned pro-
totypes with our approach on Cars 196 with VGG-16. All prototypes
activate semantically meaningful parts and mostly from the images correspond-
ing to their own label.
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Fig. 15: Visualization of the top activated prototypes for a given clean
and adversarial image pair from the Cars-196 test data. The top proto-
types corresponds to the true label, even after attack. Moreover, we observe that
the similarity score for each prototype decreases, but the attack remains unsuc-
cessful thanks to the large separation between the discriminative prototypes.
